The Once and Future Law by Hufstedler, Shirley M.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 69 Issue 4 
1991 
The Once and Future Law 
Shirley M. Hufstedler 
Hufstedler, Kaus & Ettinger 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Legal Education Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Shirley M. Hufstedler, The Once and Future Law, 69 WASH. U. L. Q. 1029 (1991). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss4/2 
This Tyrell Williams Memorial Lecture is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington 
University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an 




VOLUME 69 NUMBER 4 1991
THE TYRRELL WILLIAMS MEMORIAL
LECTURE
The Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lecture was established in 1948 by the
family and friends of Tyrrell Williams, a distinguished member of the
faculty of the Washington University School of Law from 1913 to 1946.
Since its inception, the Lectureship has provided a forum for the discussion of
significant and often controversial issues currently before the legal commu-
nity. Former Tyrrell Williams Lecturers include some of the nation's fore-
most legal scholars, judges, public servants, and practicing attorneys.
The Honorable Shirley M, Hufstedler, former Ninth Circuit Judge and
distinguished public servant, delivered the 1991 Tyrrell Williams Memorial
Lecture on the campus of Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri on
February 20, 1991.
THE ONCE AND FUTURE LAW
Shirley M. Hufstedler*
Scholarly and choleric debate has raged for years over whether a law
school should require a two or a three-year program. I believe that law
school should be confined to the second year. In the first year, the
faculty knows what is going on and the students are baffled. In the third
year, the students know what is going on and the faculty is baffled. Why
not spend all of the time in the second year, when everyone happily gets
the act together?
* Partner, Hufstedler, Kaus & Ettinger.
1029
Washington University Open Scholarship
1030 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 69:1029
Students entering law school do not begin the study of law, because,
while law has beginnings, law study has no starting line. Instead, stu-
dents are plopped in the middle of a web, oblivious to the strands of law
surrounding them and to the directions in which each strand leads. The
hapless student soon realizes that he or she is enmeshed, as first one and
then another law teacher twangs the web and starts to reel in the student
body. Although law teachers are web spinners, be assured that they
otherwise bear no resemblance to spiders. No law teacher has ever de-
voured a student, although rumors suggest that a few professors have
been known to munch on students.
Lawyers are a disputatious lot. Law schools are crammed with law-
yers, budded and budding, and ringed with alumni. Alumni, critical ele-
ments in the debating mix, are all self-styled legal education experts.
Their presence alters the debate because they cannot be subjected to rig-
orous cross-examination without jeopardizing the funding of the school.
Certitudes are hard to come by these days, but it is almost a sure thing
that alumni can be counted on to assure each other, and the current
class, that, when they were students, the school was better and a lot
harder than it is today. Moreover, the longer the lawyer has been out of
school, the harder and the better the old school was. So when Curmud-
geon '40 meets Curmudgeon '39, the conversation goes like this: "What
is this school coming to? We have Washington University graduates
these days who think that trover is a pup's name. Why, I haven't seen a
one of these young whippersnappers who could identify a springing use if
it pounced on him." "No wonder, Tybalt, the place is littered with es-
capees from Yale who fill the kids' heads with nonsense like housing pol-
icy, pollution, and law and psychiatry."
Stripped of nostalgia's edited amnesia, history reveals that law schools
are in fact far superior to what they once were. Law professors generally
are not more brilliant, scholarly, or empathetic than they were in bygone
days. Rather, the quality of law students has escalated dramatically.
The result is that fine law schools have never before had student bodies as
challenging as they are now.
Despite all of the quarreling about legal education, some consensus has
developed. One of the areas of agreement is that during the first and
second years of law school students should learn a core curriculum of
basic substantive law, elementary procedure, and legal method. With
some fussing about details, the hard-core law usually consists of the law-
yers' traditional grist: contracts, torts, constitutional law, criminal law,
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commercial transactions, family law, trusts, wills, property, procedure,
legal writing, and elementary jurisprudence.
By the end of the first year, students are supposed to know how to get
in and out of the law library, how to find a case while there, and how to
read and to understand it. Students have met the "reasonable man," that
marvelous tower of prudence, who threads his perilous way through
every kind of travail and always behaves in his impeccably reasonable
way. They have lived with Ms. Palsgraf' during her most exciting day,
can drop res ipsa loquitur into a conversational gap, and can murmur
stare decisis on moonlit nights. Having survived the early Socratic Wars,
students, have begun to think in questions. In short, law students are
well along in the process of learning how to think like lawyers.
So much for the good news. The bad news is that legal education, even
in the best law schools, is not good enough to prepare lawyers to think
about, let alone to handle, all kinds of major problems with which they
now must grapple. The deficiencies are even more glaring when we con-
template the issues with which lawyers must deal in the near future.
I do not doubt that lawyers are going to continue to provide tradi-
tional legal services for the foreseeable future. They are going to try law-
suits, plan estates, merge corporations, draw contracts, minister to sickly
businesses, counsel clients, and eject tenants. Those of you who become
general practioners in some communities may perform all of these serv-
ices for your clients. However, those of you who become associates in
large metropolitan law offices will be required to specialize, sometimes in
areas of the law for which you have received no law-school training at
all. If you become a litigator, you will produce and consume enough
paper to reforest a town, though you will have very little opportunity to
try a civil lawsuit.
In the curmudgeons' generation of lawyers (my own), law firms were
primarily local and, comparatively speaking, small. A "large" law firm
had twenty lawyers. Today, law firms have become both trans-national
and international. We consider a metropolitan law firm of fewer than
100 lawyers small. The megafirms today are farther removed from those
of the 1940s than the law firms of the 1940s were removed from firms of
the 19th century.
Not only has the practice of law changed, and changed dramatically,
1. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
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but lawyers today fill many other roles in our society for which tradi-
tional legal training prepares them very little, if at all.
Lawyers in our society have always assumed public roles in far greater
numbers than their percentage of the general population can explain.
They have occupied a majority of chairs in the executive and legislative
branches of government, and they have a monopoly on the judiciary.
Lawyers continue to sit on more than their aliquot share of business and
charitable boards, commissions, and foundations. More than any other
identifiable group, lawyers have shaped and often directed public policy
at every level.
The role of lawyers has changed drastically in recent years because
social, political, and economic structures, here and abroad, have changed
drastically. The once stark lines between dependence and independence,
between public and private action, and between foreign and domestic af-
fairs have blurred almost to the point of obliteration. The industrial
revolution, the technological revolution, the biomedical revolution, and
the gender revolution affect every aspect of our daily lives.
To respond to these convulsive changes, Americans pass laws. The
more helpless we feel in coping with change, the more laws we pass,
punctuated, of course, by studies to discuss the problems about which we
are too frightened to legislate. The statement, "there ought to be a law"
is not merely a cliche; it is an expression of the American psyche.
The endless bog of statutes, ordinances, by-laws, regulations, and judi-
cial decisions in which we now live evidences the level of American anxi-
ety. We no longer can house them in their pristine state. We reprint
them on gnats' eyeballs and retrieve them by computers. Even if we
wrote them in standard English, and we often do not, no one can read
them all, let alone live by them. Yet, this incredible mass of laws in-
trudes upon each of us in everything we do. Unfortunately, lawyers
wrote most of these laws, and we have had no small part in imposing
them on ourselves and on everyone else.
Who voted for this legal explosion? Nobody did, not even lawyers.
We accomplished this through the tyranny of small decisions and the
power of technology to give us the means to elevate our little follies into
national and international disasters. For any comfort it may be, lawyers
did not create the industrial revolution, the post-industrial society, or the
interdependence of the inhabitants on our planet, and nobody voted for
any of them.
As you would expect, much has been written about how we got our-
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selves into this fix and how to get ourselves out of it. As usual, occa-
sional kernels of thought lurk underneath lots of chaff. John Barton, a
Stanford law teacher, wrote one of them. Professor Barton's thesis in his
article, "Behind the Legal Explosion,"2 is that in the past, the primary
system regulating society and social relationships was not enacted law,
but culturally inculcated customs and traditions. "Where law and cus-
tom are closely coupled," he says, "it is the custom or the ethos that
primarily shapes behavior and enforces law. Most men therefore obey
the law, and most dispute settlements coincide closely with the norms of
the law."3 What has happened, he contends, is that the congruence of
law and ethos has shattered. We no longer have a shared core of values
and customs to make us cohesive. Instead, we have tried to glue our-
selves together with bonds of law, a method that now has proved re-
soundingly unsuccessful because the law has become more and more
artificial. The more intractable are the substantive issues, the more elab-
orate are the procedures we devise to postpone decisions on hard ques-
tions to try to avoid the necessity of ever making a decision on the merits.
Professor Barton's thesis is sound. I quibble with him only in his fail-
ure to analyze more deeply the old ethos and what happened to it. Pro-
fessor Barton's assumption that cultural values were widely shared is
only partially true. The dominant members of the society shared and
accepted the values he assumes. These same people also enacted and
enforced the laws. Therefore, it is not in the least surprising that the
dominant cultural values and the laws were mutually reinforcing.
The dominant members of American society were white, protestant
men. Non-white men and women of every color were omitted from the
value system. Until very recently, it would have been as idle to ask those
Americans omitted from the dominant ethos whether they subscribed to
the values imposed on them as it would have been to conduct a poll
among medieval serfs to find out if they liked the feudal system. In both
cases the questions and the answers would have been irrelevant. Until
very recently, American women and a majority of non-white men had no
education, no property, no vote, and hence no choice. The old ethos has
not disappeared, but the pluralistic value systems that were heretofore
submerged have surfaced. White men still dominate every level of the
American structures of power, but they no longer have a monopoly, and
2. John Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REv. 567 (1975).
3. Id. at 574.
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they can no longer successfully impose their views on everyone else at
home and abroad.
The old order has been shattered by the impact of multiple shooting
wars and by even more far-reaching revolutions in theology, politics, so-
ciology, economics, technology, and the physical sciences. The combina-
tion of these forces has made it impossible for that still powerful white
male minority to continue to impose their value systems universally.
They must respond at the law-making level to some of the demands
made upon them, domestically and internationally, by those who want
their fair share of the world's bounty; otherwise they cannot politically
survive.
No one yields power gladly. A large part of the artificiality of the law,
to which Professor Barton calls our attention, is attributable to efforts to
retain control while at the same time appearing to yield to demands. The
extraordinary jungle of regulations applicable to the welfare system, for
example, cannot be explained simply by the American penchant for law-
making or by incompetent draftsmanship of epic proportions. Is it not
plausible that the legislators and rulemakers really do not want to make
it easy for poor people to share very much?
I do not wish to convey the impression that I believe that the enor-
mous amount of social welfare legislation enacted during the last fifty
years was written by legislators to preserve their own positions. A great
deal of it resulted from truly generous and humanitarian impulses. The
problem is more subtle. A majority of legislators, judges, and other deci-
sionmakers still respond to the very ethos that Professor Barton identi-
fied, without any consciousness of guilt and without any appreciation of
the impact that the multiple revolutions have had on the state of the
human condition. Their educations, formal and informal, did not pre-
pare them for an objective appraisal of their own attitudes, or for under-
taking a holistic view of astonishing variety and bewildering complexity
with which they must somehow deal.
Mr. Justice Holmes has been quoted frequently for the observation:
"The rational study of law is still to a large extent the study of history...
for historic continuity with the past is not a duty, it is only a necessity." 4
And his contemporary, Mr. Justice Cardozo, with equal confidence, said:
Life casts the molds of conduct, which will some day become fixed as law.
4. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897), quoted in
John M. Kernochan, The Distribution Right in the United States ofAmerica: Review and Reflections,
42 VAND. L. REv. 1407, 1408 (1989).
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Law preserves the molds, which have taken form and shape from life.
[T]he judge is under a duty, within the limits of his power of innovation, to
maintain a relation between law and morals, between the precepts of juris-
prudence and those of reason and good conscience.5
Both statements were essentially valid at the time they were spoken,
but they are, at best, half-truths today. The study of law to a large extent
is still the study of history, and law is just as good as it ever was to solve
historic problems. The trouble is that many of the issues now con-
fronting us have no historical antecedents, and law can no longer simply
follow the molds of life when mankind has the means to recast at will the
molds of life itself. Mr. Justice Holmes' famous apothegm, "a page of
history is worth a volume of logic,"6 is simply irrelevant if we do not
have a line, much less a page, of history to examine, and if we are unable
to apply logic because we cannot locate a premise with a laser beam.
Public awareness of the scientific revolutions is very dim, and few law-
yers or judges are better informed than the general public. The only ma-
jor public debate upon matters involving sophisticated technology has
centered on military weaponry and nuclear energy, and the level of de-
bate on these topics has not been edifying. The implications of current
research in genetic engineering, biochemistry, and microbiology have
scarcely rippled the surface of national consciousness. The same obser-
vations are equally applicable to the fields of communications technology
and micro-electronics.
The closest we have come to touching even the periphery of the awe-
some issues that science and technology pose is the controversy over
abortion and, to a lesser extent, the debate about a right to die. Few
Americans are completely oblivious to the abortion uproar, even if they
have never heard of Roe v. Wade.7 Thousands of Americans know some-
thing about life support mechanisms and their effect upon comatose, in-
jured, or terminally ill patients, even if they have never heard of Karen
Ann Quinlan or Nancy Cruzan.
We have learned a few things from Roe v. Wade, In re Quinlan,' and
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,' but they are not re-
assuring. In none of these cases was any complicated scientific or techni-
5, BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 133-34 (1921).
6. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921).
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
9. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
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cal data involved. No difference in medical opinion exists on such
straightforward facts as the development of the human fetus or the extent
of organic brain damage that vegetative human beings have sustained.
The technology used to terminate a pregnancy, or to give or remove a
mechanical life support system also is simple. The cases are extraordina-
rily hard because they raise ethical, moral, and philosophic questions, as
well as basic issues of governance, with which we are ill prepared to deal.
Who decides whether we will be born or whether we are alive or dead?
Does the state bear or share the decision? Is the decision left to the indi-
vidual? If so, to whom? What principles apply to the decision and in
whose philosophic, ethical, or religious framework?
We know that none of us welcomes responsibility for deciding ques-
tions that, even arguably, involve the life or death of human beings. We
do not trust anyone else to decide the questions affecting ourselves. Few
appreciate that nondecision of these issues is also a decision, because a
nondecision on termination of a pregnancy or on removal of an artificial
life support system also affects life and risks death.
The medical profession, for the most part, has been reluctant to the
point of paralysis in reaching any judgment. Legislators have run for
cover. Judges have decided the issues because, until very recently, no
other members of government have been required to face the responsibil-
ity of decision.
Regardless of your views on the results or the persuasiveness of the
reasoning in the opinions, you should find it unsettling that lawyers
presented these cases and judges decided them. You should be disturbed
because you then have an inkling of the depth of the legal and philo-
sophic problems that are created by mankind's ability to intervene in the
processes of life and death.
History provided a lot of footnotes for Roe, but little substantive or
philosophical help. Legal philosophy and theological principles, devel-
oped when only God could control life processes, do not easily retain
their vitality when humanity has increasingly arrogated to itself the
tasks once left to divine providence. We have not reached consensus
about the morality of intervention; worse, most of us do not even know
how to think about it.
Our lack of a coherent philosophy, coupled with the traditional inca-
pacity of the law to keep pace with the recent past, means that law, law-
yers, and judges are ill-equipped to deal with the dilemmas presented by
current and future science and technology. Discoveries in microbiology,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss4/2
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biochemistry, and genetics are being made at a dizzying rate. The devel-
opments of technology, such as electron microscopes and computers of
extraordinary capability, combined with discoveries in microbiology, ge-
netics, and biochemistry, have opened vistas of biological and genetic en-
gineering of awesome scope. The capacity for good and evil that flows
from these events staggers the most fervid imagination.
Scientists are now probing the innermost secrets of cells. They are
learning the mechanisms by which cells are directed to grow and to stop
growing, to differentiate themselves into liver, brain, or kidney cells.
That research can lead to the defeat of cancer, the possibility of regener-
ating lost, diseased, or injured human organs or other body parts, and to
halt or possibly reverse the aging process. It can also lead to a new world
of domination and dehumanization.
Scientists use asexual reproduction of mammalian cells to reveal the
details of the cells' biochemical and genetic life. As you know, various
kinds of lower life forms and some kinds of plants reproduce asexually.
Offspring grow from adult cells without the joinder of male and female
cells. Scientists call such a sexual offspring clones, and each clone is an
exact genetic copy of its parent cell. Laboratories studying basic bio-
chemical and genetic structures regularly clone human cells. No one is
trying to produce a full-grown human clone, but the means to do so
someday may be possible, unless research is stopped cold or seriously
restricted.
Non-scientists are somewhat more familar with the technique for
transplanting bits of DNA from one cell into a completely different cell,
despite neither cell's having had the remotest relationship to the other
before this genetic sleight of hand. Using recombinant DNA techniques,
a scientist can transform a plant cell into a wholly different plant cell, or
can combine a mammalian cell with a plant cell, much to the astonish-
ment of Darwin's ghost. Like cloning, the use of recombinant DNA can
teach us an enormous amount about cellular functions and structure,
and, like cloning, it has other potentials for good. But it also has its
fearsome mien because it also may have the potential to produce life
forms that will destroy other living organisms, including us, or to so far
distort evolution as to alter every life process as we know it.
Scientists engaged in this research are not oblivious to the implications
of their work. Not all of them, however, are as sensitive to the potential
effects of their research as they ought to be, or as willing as we want them
to be to accept moral responsibility for that uncertain future that they are
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shaping. Those scientists who are fully sensitive to the moral responsibil-
ity for research decisions should not be compelled to bear that burden
alone. Just as law is too important to be left to lawyers, so also is science
too important to be entrusted entirely to scientists. Scientists have the
potential for greater good for humanity than do lawyers, but so also have
they a potential for even greater harm.
The issues science and technology pose cannot be attacked by histori-
cal citations or by invocations of philosophic thought rooted in ancient
Greece. Natural law is not a helpful place to begin to think about man-
aging "unnatural" developments. Moreover, the traditional economists'
cost-benefit model, though not irrelevant, cannot assist in the creation of
a new philosophy; dollar values cannot be affixed to the processes of life,
at least as long as we retain enough humanity to have individual con-
sciences and enough hope to believe that we have souls.
Professor Laurence H. Tribe has succinctly stated why analysis of the
new technology based on lineal concepts of means-and-ends is
inadequate:
More pervasive than the realm of technologies pursued as ends is that of
technologies which, although pursued largely as means, have the effect of
significantly altering the ends and indeed the basic character of the individ-
uals and the communities that choose them. Should certain techniques of
genetic engineering, for example, be developed? Should research into par-
ticular methods of neurological manipulation, to pose another illustration,
be publicly subsidized? Attempting to answer questions of this sort entirely
on the basis of instrumental analyses (e.g., "What will be the impact of
these choices in terms of the present preferences and values of the affected
persons?") is bound to miss the most basic point, which is that the answers
to questions of this sort will determine not only the degree to which various
currently held values will be advanced or sacrificed but also, and most im-
portantly, the ways in which the character of these values (and of the basic
conceptions and modes of thought that underlie them) will themselves be
defined over time. 1°
Before we can make any headway in learning how to cope with specific
issues such as genetic engineering, we have to find means to resolve the
paradox created in a society suffering from specialization, ignorance, and
information overload. Isaiah Berlin poses this dilemma very well in Con-
versations with Henry Brandon:
10. Laurence H. Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of In-
strumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617, 642 (1973).
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As knowledge [becomes] more and more specialized, the fewer are the per-
sons who know enough ... about everything to be wholly in charge....
One of the paradoxical consequences is therefore the dependence of a large
number of human beings upon a collection of ill-coordinated experts, each
of whom sooner or later becomes oppressed and irritated by being unable to
step out of his box and survey the relationship of his particular activity to
the whole. The experts cannot know enough. The coordinators always did
move in the dark, but now they are aware of it. And the more honest and
intelligent ones are rightly frightened by the fact that their responsibility
increases in direct ratio to their ignorance of an ever-expanding field. 1
Berlin was not talking about lawyers and judges, but his remarks could
not have been more apt if he had named us. Lawyers should be shivering
about the responsibilities they wittingly or unwittingly have assumed as
societal coordinators. No judge worthy of the robe is not thoroughly
dismayed by the duty, not only to coordinate, but to decide an endless
array of issues about which he or she is woefully uninformed.
Surely we can forgive legal educators of twenty and thirty years ago
for failing to teach us computer technology, microbiology, and macro-
economics. Those fields of knowledge scarcely had been planted at that
time. But legal educators cannot now pretend that those revolutions are
irrelevant in training lawyers. The notion that lawyers are generalists, or
the more paleontological boast that lawyers are the last of the generalists,
is false advertising. The law schools, especially the great law schools,
must mend their pedagogic ways, or they may well produce only legal
historians.
Teaching a core legal curriculum will be relevant to training lawyers
for the foreseeable future, although the substance of the core will be mod-
ified. But law schools should complete the core education in two years.
The student already should have learned to think like a lawyer, and then
he or she should start learning how to think like a thinker.
This brings me to the third year of law school, which I lightly tossed
away when I began. I threw it away because, more often than not, the
third year is not as productive as it should be. For students who are
working on the law review or in other activities requiring them to teach
each other, the acquisition of those teaching skills may assuage third-year
ennui. Some good clinical programs help, but even a bad clinical pro-
gram can be healthy because it sends pallid students outside to exercise in
11. ISAIAH BERLIN, CONVERSATIONS WITH HENRY BRANDON 25-26 (1968).
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the fresh air. These merits, however, do not alone justify retention of the
third year in its present form.
Unpatentable though it is for lack of novelty, I would convert the third
year into an interdisciplinary program. The only new feature would re-
quire the law teachers to attend the classes along with the other students.
Dr. Harlan Cleveland has sometimes described existing interdisciplinary
courses as a favored academic device for avoiding interdisciplinary
thought, by using several professors to teach the same group of students.
What too often happens is that each teacher teaches his or her own disci-
pline; it is the students who are expected to be interdisciplinary.
The house of the law always has been a house of many mansions. But
the mansions themselves need remodelling. The law schools may be the
future architects or, at least, the interior designers. I can be sure only
that each of you will live in that house, and what you do to shape it will
affect not only you, but countless others with whom we are privileged to
share our fragile planet for our brief visits.
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